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a b s t r a c t
A seasoned equity offering (SEO) can improve a firm’s stock liquidity and lower its cost of capital. This paper
examines whether SEO firms achieve a liquidity gain and the sources of this gain. It explores the role of
liquidity risk in explaining SEO long-run performance. The evidence shows that SEO firms experience
significant post-issue improvements in liquidity and reductions in liquidity risk. Size and book-to-market
matching fails to control for these liquidity effects, generating the low long-term post-SEO performance
documented in the literature. After adjusting for liquidity risk, SEO firms show normal long-term
performance.
 2012 Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Firms care about their stock liquidity because it affects their
costs of capital through the premium investors require for holding
illiquid or high liquidity-risk stocks.1 A seasoned equity offering
(SEO) can improve liquidity by shifting the firm’s shareholder base
towards more active traders and by increasing market visibility,
where the latter can stimulate trading by lowering the adverse selec-
tion costs of trading with a better informed counterparty. Eckbo
et al. (2007) confirm that managers consider liquidity improvements
when issuing equity.2
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we investigate
whether SEO firms improve their stock liquidity post-issue and
where liquidity gains come from. In particular, we examine institu-
tional investor share ownership and analyst coverage, the two
factors that previous studies associate with lower adverse selection
costs of trading and more frequent trading (Falkenstein, 1996;
Irvine, 2003; Roulstone, 2003; Rubin, 2007; Agarwal, 2007). Sec-
ond, we examine whether liquidity gains and reduced post-SEO
liquidity risk explain low long-run post-SEO stock performance.
We examine four measures of liquidity to capture its multiple
dimensions. The first two are Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate
of stock transactions costs, which captures effective spread, and
Amihud’s (2002) return to volume ratio, which measures the price
impact of trade. Goyenko et al. (2009) show that these two liquid-
ity proxies relate closely to realized trade cost and price impact
measures estimated from high frequency TAQ and Rule 605 data.
The other two measures are stock turnover, which captures the
ability to trade large quantities of stock, and Liu’s (2006) illiquidity
measure, which captures multidimensional aspects of liquidity,
with an emphasis on trading speed.
We show that SEO firms experience significant improvements
in post-issue liquidity. Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate falls by
24% over the 5 years after the issue compared with the 5 years
pre-issue. Liu’s (2006) trading discontinuity measure shows a
69% liquidity gain over the same period. Similar comparisons using
0378-4266  2012 Elsevier B.V.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.07.009
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 1524 593635; fax: +44 1524 847321.
E-mail addresses: p.bilinski@lancaster.ac.uk (P. Bilinski), weimin.liu@nottingham.
ac.uk (W. Liu), norman.strong@mbs.ac.uk (N. Strong).
1 A growing literature shows that expected returns are positively related to
illiquidity or liquidity risk (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002; Pastor
and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006; Liu, 2006).
2 As a real-life example, New Oriental Education and Technology Group Inc
(NYSE:EDU) justified a new equity issue as follows, ‘‘New Oriental Education and
Technology Group Inc could embark on a secondary share issue valued at more than
100 mln USD next year to add liquidity to trading in its stock, chief financial officer
Louis Hsieh said. The investment banks are asking us to float more shares, so that
would be the most likely outcome, he said. Such an issue would help trading volume
as well as allow long-term shareholders and venture capital firms to realize returns
on their stock, he added.’’ Xinhua Financial Network, 18 October 2006.
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stock turnover and Amihud’s (2002) return to volume ratio
indicate liquidity gains of 70% and 56%. SEO firms have higher
post-issue liquidity characteristics than size and book-to-market
(B/M) matched firms, indicating that size–B/M matching fails to
control for SEO firms’ liquidity gains.
Examining the sources of post-issue liquidity improvements,
SEO firms experience a 22% increase in analyst following over the
5 years after the issue compared with the 5 years pre-issue. A high-
er analyst following improves the amount and quality of informa-
tion about the firm, lowering the adverse selection costs of trading
and increasing market liquidity (Irvine, 2003; Roulstone, 2003).
The number of institutional investors holding SEO firm stock in-
creases by 39% on average, and their stake increases by 31%. This
suggests that SEOs attract institutional investors, who become
more dominant after the offering. Increased institutional trading
and greater competition between sophisticated investors reduce
the adverse selection costs of trading with a better informed party
and can explain SEO liquidity gains (Falkenstein, 1996; Rubin,
2007; Agarwal, 2007). We also find that increases in analyst fol-
lowing and institutional investor holdings are larger for Nasdaq
than NYSE/AMEX stocks, coinciding with the higher liquidity gains
for Nasdaq listed SEOs. Regression analysis confirms that the high-
er post-issue liquidity of SEO firms relates to changes in analyst
coverage and institutional holdings.
Consistent with past evidence, SEOs experience negative buy-
and-hold abnormal returns relative to size–B/M matched stocks,
and negative alphas in Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
(FF3FM) regressions. Post-issue calendar time regressions show
that SEO firms have lower exposure to the liquidity factor of a
liquidity-augmented CAPM (LCAPM). The change in liquidity risk
is 0.237 using equal weighting (EW) and 0.106 using value
weighting (VW). Given an average monthly liquidity premium over
1970–2009 of 0.615%, these changes lower post-issue SEO ex-
pected returns by 0.146% (EW) and 0.065% (VW) per month. The
result is that, after adjusting for liquidity risk, SEO firms show nor-
mal long-term performance.
A series of robustness checks confirms the liquidity risk expla-
nation of low long-run post-SEO performance. These include exam-
ining SEOs by industry, firm age, type of equity issued, hot and cold
issue periods, SEO portfolios formed 3- and 6-months after the is-
sue, and SEOs where the post-issue period includes the liquidity
drought during the recent financial crisis. Further analysis shows
that size–B/M matched stocks have higher liquidity risk than SEO
firms, which explains the significant negative long-run abnormal
returns to SEO firms when using these as benchmark stocks.
Matching on liquidity after the issue equates SEO and matched
stock performance.
This study is not the first to examine the explanatory power of
liquidity risk for the long-run performance of SEO firms. Eckbo
et al. (2000), Eckbo and Norli (2005) and Eckbo et al. (2007) also
investigate the relation between liquidity and SEO performance.
Eckbo et al. (2000) show that SEO stock turnover improves after
the issue. Eckbo andNorli (2005) show that a turnover liquidity aug-
mented Carhart (1997) model explains long-term post-IPO perfor-
mance and, in a robustness test, that this model explains
long-term post-SEO returns. Eckbo et al. (2007) report no abnormal
performance, using the same model, for industrial, financial, and
utility SEOs. This study differs from and complements these earlier
studies by providing a detailed and comprehensive description of
the liquidity evolution of SEO firms.
First, to capture the multiple dimensions of liquidity, we use
four measures to describe SEO liquidity characteristics before and
after the issue, and provide a detailed analysis of SEO liquidity
dynamics. Second, we show that post-issue liquidity gains are
due to a reduction in information asymmetry and improved share
trading, as analyst coverage of SEO stocks and institutional stock
ownership both increase. Third, we show that SEOs experience sig-
nificant decreases in liquidity risk exposure. Existing studies lar-
gely ignore pre- to post-issue changes in liquidity.3 Fourth, we
use a liquidity risk factor based on trading discontinuity that cap-
tures multiple dimensions of liquidity. In contrast, Eckbo and Norli’s
(2005) liquidity risk factor is based on stock turnover. But Lee and
Swaminathan (2000) find that high-turnover stocks tend to be small
stocks, which questions turnover as a liquidity measure, and Liu
(2010) reports an insignificant pre-1963 premium associated with
stock turnover. Using all CRSP stocks, we show that the LCAPM de-
scribes the cross-section of stock returns based on liquidity sorts
over the period 1970–2009, whereas the FF3FM and the FF3FM aug-
mented by a turnover-based factor do not. Fifth, Eckbo and Norli
(2005) and Eckbo et al. (2007) include a momentum factor in their
analysis, which the literature commonly associates with less-than-
rational investor behavior, so their analysis cannot rule out a behav-
ioral explanation of SEO returns. In contrast, our results provide clear
and comprehensive evidence of a liquidity-based discount rate
explanation of post-SEO returns.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
the distribution of new equity issues over the sample period. Sec-
tion 3 confirms previous findings of low SEO performance using 5-
year buy-and-hold returns. Section 4 reports SEO firms’ liquidity
characteristics before and after the offering, and compared to
size–B/M matched stocks. It also explores the relation between
post-issue liquidity changes and analyst following and institu-
tional share ownership. Section 5 analyzes SEO performance in cal-
endar and event time. Section 6 presents robustness tests and
Section 7 concludes.
2. Data and sample selection criteria
Our seasoned equity offerings sample is from the SDCNew Issues
database. The sample period starts in January 1970 and ends in
December 2009. To allow for a 5-year holding period, the last offer-
ing is in December 2004. The sample includes all US domiciled com-
panies listed on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq that make SEOs of pure
primary shares or combinations of primary and equity sales by ama-
jor shareholder (combinations) in the US market. It includes indus-
trial, financial, and utility firms but excludes unit offerings and SEOs
that simultaneously offer debt, preferred stock, or warrants. The
sample also excludes private placements, exchange offers of stock,
144A offers, cancelled offers, and spin-off related issues. These crite-
ria lead to an initial sample of 9928 issues. From this we exclude
equity offerings by the same company occurring during the (5-year)
holding period of a previous equity offering, leaving a sample of
6986 SEOs. This is because Lyon et al. (1999) report severe cross-sec-
tional correlation and misspecified tests when event windows for
the same company overlap. Retaining offerings of common stock
only (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) with return data available for at
least a month after the issue leaves 6425 SEOs. Data requirements
on market and book values of common equity from the Compu-
stat/CRSP merged database leave 4503 offerings. We find control
stocks for 4446 issues, which form our main sample.
Table 1 describes the sample distribution stratified by ex-
change, broad industry group (financial, industry, and utility), type
of equity issue (pure sales of primary shares and offers accompa-
nied by sales of equity by a major shareholder), membership of
nine Fama and French (1993) size–B/M portfolios, issue period,
and whether the issue takes place in a hot or cold issue period.4
3 An exception is the independent study of Lin and Wu (2010) who focus on SEO
timing and liquidity risk.
4 We define an issue month as hot (cold) if the number of SEOs in the month before
the issue is above (below) the median monthly number of SEOs in the previous
12 months.
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Of the 4446 SEOs, 1995 are on NYSE/AMEX and 2451 are on Nasdaq.
Industrial firms form the largest group with 3447 SEOs, compared to
482 utility and 517 financial SEOs. Using NYSE breakpoints to split
issuers into three portfolios, small (S), medium (Me), and big (B) by
market value of common equity and three portfolios, high (H), med-
ium (M), and low (L) by B/M, gives 2433 small compared to 665 large
capitalization stocks and 2011 low B/M stocks, of which 1204 are
small. This coincides with previous findings that small, low B/M
stocks dominate new equity issuers. The number of new equity is-
sues increases over time with 1809 SEOs in the 1990s. Almost
two-thirds of the sample (3042) occur in hot issue periods with over
56% listed on Nasdaq.
3. The long-run performance of SEOs: Event time analysis
Previous studies of post-SEO long-run performance in event
time report buy-and-hold returns that are significantly lower, both
statistically and economically, than size–B/M matched stocks. To
confirm these findings for our sample, we match based on the clos-
est neighbor approach, following Loughran and Ritter (1995). We
pair each issuer with non-issuing firms in a 30% bracket of the is-
suer’s equity value at the year-end before the offering, where non-
issuers are firms that have not issued equity in the past 5 years.
From this pool we select a control firm with the closest B/M to
the issuer’s. To avoid hindsight bias we use book value of equity
for the fiscal year 2 years earlier if an issue takes place in the first
6 months of a year and book value from the previous fiscal year for
issues in the second 6 months of the year. The definition of B/M fol-
lows Fama and French (1992).5 We include the control for a 5-year
holding period and allow each control to pair with one SEO over the
holding period. Pairing each control with one SEO over the holding
period reduces problems of cross-sectional correlation. If a match
delists or issues equity, we choose a new match from the original list
of eligible stocks. We truncate the SEO and its match return on the
date an issuing firm delists. Firm i’s ti-month buy-and-hold return
(BHR) is
BHRi ¼
Yti
s¼1
ð1þ RisÞ  1 ð1Þ
where Ris is firm i’s month s stock return. The holding period starts at
the beginning of themonth following the issue and ends at the earlier
of the 5-year anniversary or the delisting date. To avoid a delisting
bias, we follow Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther
(1999) and include delisting returns.When a delisting return ismiss-
ing, we assume a return of 1 for delisting due to liquidation (CRSP
codes 400–490),0.33 for performance related delisting (CRSP codes
500 and 520–584), and zero otherwise. The average holding period
return across all sample stocks is BHR ¼
PN
i¼1xiBHRi, where xi denotes
EW or VW. Value weights are based onmarket value 1 month before
the offer, scaled by the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq CRSP
stock market index to give comparability over time.
Table 2 reports average BHRs for issuers and matches over a
5-year holding period; Diff, denoting the difference, gives issuers’
percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). The average
BHAR is 27.67% using EW and 26.10% using VW. With EW,
NYSE/AMEX issuers have less underperformance than Nasdaq
stocks (23.43% vs. 31.12%) and similar levels of underperfor-
mance using VW (26.23% vs. 25.26%). Skewness-adjusted t-sta-
tistics recommended by Lyon et al. (1999) show significant SEO
underperformance in all specifications at 5%.Test statistics can be
negatively biased due to cross-sectionally correlated abnormal re-
turns. Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009) propose a correlation and het-
eroskedasticity consistent test that adjusts for cross-sectional
correlation. Their test statistic takes the form t ¼ w0ARðHÞ=w0Vw,
wherew is a vector of weights,6 ARðHÞ is theH-month holding period
(60 months in this study) average abnormal return of each monthly
cohort of securities experiencing an event in month t, and V is the
T  T variance–covariance matrix of ARðHÞ, where T is the number of
monthly cohorts. Overlapping returns lead to non-zero serial covari-
ances between observations closer thanHmonths apart; all higher or-
der covariances are set to zero. Estimates of V are based on a
generalized version of White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent
variance estimator. Thepenultimate columnof Table 2 reports the Jeg-
adeesh–Karceski t-test, which decreases the magnitude of test
statistics on average by over 76%. For example, the t-statistic moves
from8.345 to1.801 for the pooled sample using EW. Despite lower
t-values, however, abnormal returns remain significant at 10%, with
the one exception of Nasdaq returns using VW, which are insignifi-
cant. We conclude that both economically and statistically the SEO
puzzle is evident in our sample.
4. The evolution of SEO liquidity characteristics
Numerous studies find a negative relation between stock liquid-
ity and expected returns (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Bren-
nanand Subrahmanyam, 1996; Brennanet al., 1998;Amihud, 2002).
Chordia et al. (2000), Lo andWang (2000), and Hasbrouck and Seppi
(2001) find commonalities in liquidity in the cross-section of stocks.
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Sadka (2006), and Liu (2006) show
that market liquidity is a relevant state variable for asset pricing.
This section explores the liquidity evolution of SEO firms.
Table 1
SEO sample distribution, 1970–2004.
Pooled sample NYSE/AMEX Nasdaq
Total 4446 1995 2451
Financial 517 242 275
Industrial 3447 1339 2108
Utility 482 414 68
Combination 1481 409 1072
Primary 2965 1586 1379
FF S–L 1204 198 1006
FF S–M 694 218 476
FF S–H 535 205 330
FF Me–L 585 250 335
FF Me–M 487 325 162
FF Me–H 276 197 79
FF B–L 222 181 41
FF B–M 265 252 13
FF B–H 178 169 9
1970s 566 439 127
1980s 1343 626 717
1990s 1809 646 1163
2000s 728 284 444
Hot 3042 1341 1701
Cold 1404 654 750
The table describes the distribution of SEOs for the pooled sample and NYSE/AMEX
and Nasdaq stocks over 1970–2004, stratified by financial (Financial), industrial
(Industrial), and utility (Utility) firms, type of offering (Primary for secondary
offerings of primary shares and Combination for a mix of primary and major
shareholder equity sale), nine Fama and French size (Small, S, Medium, Me, Big, B)
and book-to-market (High, H, Medium, M, Low, L) portfolios, the offering decade
(1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s), and the offering period (Hot for months where the
number of SEOs in the month before the issue exceeds the median over the previous
12 months, Cold for other months).
5 Book value is the Compustat book value of stockholders’ equity plus balance sheet
deferred taxes and investment tax credits less the book value of preferred stock. The
value of preferred stock is the redemption, liquidation, or par value, in that order
depending on availability. Market value of equity is the number of shares outstanding
times the end of month closing price.
6 For EW, the ith element is the ratio of the number of events in month t to the total
sample size; for VW, the ith element is the ratio of the monthly cohort’s market value
to the total sample market capitalization.
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In their horserace of effective spread and price impact proxies,
Goyenko et al. (2009, p. 167) find that ‘‘measures intended to cap-
ture other features of transaction costs, Amihud, Pastor and Stamb-
augh, and Amivest, do a poor job estimating effective and realized
spreads’’, illustrating the need to use multiple measures to capture
different liquidity dimensions. We use four liquidity measures,
each emphasizing different liquidity dimensions. This offers a more
complete description of the evolution of SEO liquidity.
The first measure is Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimate of stock
transactions costs, c, based on Roll (1984). Hasbrouck’s (2009)
horserace of four effective transaction cost measures shows that
c clearly dominates and, among twelve spread proxies, Goyenko
et al. (2009), Table 3) find that c has the highest annual cross-
sectional correlations with effective and realized spreads calcu-
lated from TAQ data. We obtain data on c from Joel Hasbrouck’s
website.
The second liquidity measure is share turnover (TR), which rep-
resents the trading quantity dimension of liquidity. TR is the daily
number of shares traded (volume) as a percentage of the number of
shares outstanding on the day (shares out), averaged over the num-
ber of trading days (n) in the prior 12 months
TRi ¼
1
n
Xn
i¼1
volumeit
shares outit
ð2Þ
To calculate TR, a stock must have daily trading volume data avail-
able over the prior 12 months. Datar et al. (1998) report a close link
between TR and bid-ask spread. Brennan et al. (1998) and Datar
et al. (1998) show a negative cross-sectional relation between TR
and expected returns.
The third (il)liquidity measure is Liu’s (2006) LM12, defined as
the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero-trading vol-
ume days over the prior 12 months
LM12i ¼ number of zero volume days in the prior 12monthsiþ
1=TR12i
Deflator
 

2112
NoTD
; ð3Þ
where TR12 is the sum of daily turnovers (in percentage) over the
prior 12 months, Deflator = 20,000 to ensure that (1/TR12)/Defla-
tor < 1, and NoTD is the number of exchange trading days over the
prior 12 months; the final term standardizes the number of trading
days in a month to 21. Calculating LM12 requires daily trading vol-
umes over the prior 12 months. LM12 captures multiple liquidity
features such as trading quantity, trading costs, and trading conti-
nuity, with particular emphasis on the latter, which is the major
generator of the liquidity premium.
The final (il)liquidity measure is Amihud’s (2002) return to vol-
umemetric, denotedRtoV,whichmeasures theprice impact of trade.
Among different price impact proxies, Goyenko et al. (2009) report
that RtoV is generally the best candidate. RtoV is the daily ratio of
absolute daily return, R, to the dollar denominated trading volume
on the day, volume $, averaged over the prior 12 months,
RtoV i ¼
1
n
Xn
t¼1
jRitj
volume$it
: ð4Þ
Constructing RtoV requires at least an 80% availability of daily trad-
ing volumes in the prior 12 months,7 and excludes zero trading
volume days.
Analyzing liquidity characteristics requires each SEO and
control stock to have at least 1 month with non-missing liquidity
characteristics over both the 5-year pre- and post-issue periods.
Table 2
The long-run performance of SEOs.
Weight Portfolio N Issuer (%) Match (%) Diff. (%) t P t-JK p-JK
EW All exchanges 4446 46.12 73.79 27.67 8.345 0.000 1.801 0.072
VW 55.87 81.97 26.10 15.026 0.000 1.947 0.052
EW NYSE/AMEX 1995 62.22 85.65 23.43 5.209 0.000 1.773 0.076
VW 57.43 83.66 26.23 9.031 0.000 1.828 0.068
EW Nasdaq 2451 33.02 64.14 31.12 6.170 0.000 1.696 0.090
VW 45.27 70.53 25.26 5.995 0.000 1.601 0.110
The table reports the average percentage 5-year BHRs of equity issuers (Issuer) and control firms (Match) matched on size and book-to-market for a sample of 4446 SEOs using
equal weighting (EW) and value weighting (VW). Diff is the difference between these figures, t a two-sided skewness-adjusted t-statistic testing the hypothesis of no
difference between the average long-run performance of issuers and matches, and p its p-value. t-JK is the (skewness-adjusted) test statistic for Jegadeesh and Karceski’s
(2009) heteroskedasticity and correlation consistent t-test, with p-JK its corresponding p-value. N is the number of offerings. Value weights standardize market capitalization
by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to ensure comparability over time.
Table 3
Liquidity characteristics of SEOs and their matches before and after the issue.
Portfolio N Issuer Match Diff P
Panel A. 5-year liquidity characteristics before the offering
c All exchanges 3587 0.962 0.898 0.065 0.000
LM12 7.075 8.487 1.413 0.000
TR (%) 0.374 0.345 0.029 0.000
RtoV 1.857 1.391 0.465 0.000
c NYSE/AMEX 1869 0.590 0.631 0.041 0.000
LM12 3.771 5.063 1.291 0.000
TR (%) 0.245 0.289 0.043 0.000
RtoV 0.962 0.643 0.319 0.000
c Nasdaq 1718 1.595 1.351 0.244 0.000
LM12 12.690 14.309 1.619 0.000
TR (%) 0.592 0.441 0.151 0.000
RtoV 3.378 2.663 0.715 0.000
Panel B. 5-year liquidity characteristics after the offering
c All exchanges 3587 0.736 0.927 0.191 0.000
LM12 2.228 7.881 5.653 0.000
TR (%) 0.636 0.455 0.182 0.000
RtoV 0.821 1.974 1.153 0.000
c NYSE/AMEX 1869 0.517 0.672 0.156 0.000
LM12 1.514 5.239 3.725 0.000
TR (%) 0.383 0.362 0.020 0.000
RtoV 0.619 0.975 0.356 0.000
c Nasdaq 1718 0.984 1.215 0.231 0.000
LM12 3.034 10.864 7.830 0.000
TR (%) 0.923 0.559 0.364 0.000
RtoV 1.049 3.101 2.052 0.000
The table reports the average effective cost of trading, c (102), Liu’s (2006)
liquidity measure, LM12, daily share turnover rate, TR, and Amihud’s (2002) return
to volume measure, RtoV ( 106). The effective cost of trading, c, is Hasbrouck’s
(2009) annual Gibbs estimate of stock transactions costs. TR is the daily number of
shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on the day averaged
over the prior 12 months, as a percentage. RtoV is the absolute daily return divided
by the dollar denominated trading volume on the day averaged over the prior
12 months. The table gives the liquidity characteristics of SEOs (Issuer) and their
size–B/M benchmarks (Match). Diff is the mean difference between these values and
p the corresponding p-value. N is the number of observations. Panel A shows results
for the 5-year period before the offering, Panel B for the 5-year post-offering period.
7 Amihud (2002) requires at least 200 daily trading volumes in the prior
12 months.
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This reduces the sample to 3587 issues but ensures a consistent
comparison of pre- and post-offering liquidity characteristics. We
examine all four liquidity measures from January 1965 to Decem-
ber 2009.8 The sample reduction (from 4446 to 3587) is due to more
frequent missing liquidity characteristics for Nasdaq compared to
NYSE/AMEX issuing and control stocks.9
4.1. The evolution of SEO and benchmark stock liquidity around equity
issues
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the four liquidity measures during
the 5 years before and after the issue for SEO firms and their size–
B/M matches. In Fig. 1a, the cost of trading SEO stocks, c (102), in-
creases from 0.82 five years before to 1.063 ten months before the
issue. It decreases in the period leading up to an issue, reaching
0.967 one month before. This coincides with the period when the
company is planning the issue. Trading costs continue to drift
down following the issue, from 0.918 one month after to 0.694
eighteen months after, leveling out at 0.723 over the subsequent
period. Matching stocks experience no improvements in trading
costs with a mean c of 0.877 before and 0.925 after the issue.
Fig. 1b shows a gradual increase in average daily turnover rates.
Daily turnover increases from 0.29% five years before to 0.384%
twelve months before the issue. TR jumps to 0.524% one month be-
fore the issue and continues to increase after the issue, from 0.628%
one month after to a peak of 0.744% in the eleventh month after.
Average TR decreases to 0.616% two years after the issue and levels
out at around 0.61% over the remaining period. Size–B/M control
stocks exhibit little change in TR with average TR increasing from
0.333% pre-issue to 0.456% post-issue. Fig. 1c shows a similar pic-
ture for LM12. LM12 falls sharply in the year before the issue, from
8.021 twelve months before to 5.757 one month before, a fall of
28.2%, and decreases further around the issue (from 5.757 one
month before to 4.802 one month after, a fall of 16.6%). Liquidity
continues to improve over the next 11 months, with an average
LM12 gain of 66.8% (from 4.802 one month after the issue to
1.597 twelve months after) and levels out around an average of
2.065 over the remaining period. Mean LM12 for matching stocks
is 8.412 in the 60 months before the issue and 7.855 in the 5-years
after.
Fig. 1d shows that RtoV (106 from now on) is relatively flat un-
til month 12 before the issue. But it decreases from 2.208 twelve
months before the issue to 1.335 one month before. It continues
to fall during the 12 months after the issue (from 0.935 one month
after to 0.505 twelve months after) and levels out at an average
0.884 over the remaining period with a slight spike in months 38
to 42 after the issue. Control stocks have an average RtoV of
1.375 pre-issue, drifting upwards to an average of 2.008 post-issue.
Table 3, Panel A shows themean liquidity characteristics of SEOs,
size–B/Mmatches, and their differences for the5-yearpre-issueper-
iod. SEOs have significantly higher trading costs than benchmark
stocks pre-issue with amean c difference between SEOs and control
stocks of 0.065. SEOs have lower LM12 and higher TR (mean differ-
ences between SEOs and control stocks are 1.413 and 0.029%)
and higher RtoV (mean difference is 0.465). Mean differences in
liquidity between SEOs and control stocks are highly significant,
which suggests that size–B/M matching fails to match on liquidity.
Table 3, Panel B shows the mean liquidity characteristics of
SEOs and their size–B/M matches over the 5-year post-issue peri-
od. We make two observations. First, SEO liquidity improves
relative to benchmark stocks. SEO trading costs fall and the average
difference in c between SEOs and size–B/Mmatches falls to0.191.
The mean differences in LM12 and TR increase in magnitude to
5.653 and 0.182%, 4 and 6.3 times the magnitudes in Panel A.
The difference in RtoV becomes negative, decreasing from 0.465
in Panel A to 1.153 in Panel B. Second, the increased liquidity
mismatch post-issue is due to higher SEO liquidity. Issuers’ trading
Fig. 1. Evolution of four liquiditymeasures for a sample of SEOs and their size–B/Mmatched control stocks. (a) The average cost of share trading, c (102). (b) The average daily
turnover rate, TR (in.%). (c) The average liquidity measure of Liu (2006), LM12. (d) Amihud’s (2002) return to volume measure, RtoV ( 106). The effective cost of trading, c, is
Hasbrouck’s (2009) annual Gibbs estimate of transactions cost. TR is the daily number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on the day averaged over the
prior 12 months. RtoV is the absolute daily return divided by the dollar denominated trading volume on the day averaged over the prior 12 months. The figures report the end of
month liquidity characteristics for the sample of 3587 SEOs (SEO) and their size–B/M matched control stocks (Match) for the 5-year periods before and after the issue.
8 Hasbrouck (2009) estimates c at the year-end using daily price data over the prior
12 months. We use this estimate for each of the next 12 months.
9 Footnote 10 below summarises the results of an analysis of the possible effects of
this sample reduction, which suggests that conclusions reached on the smaller
sample apply to the main sample.
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costs fall from 0.962 in Panel A to 0.736 in Panel B, a 23.51% de-
crease. LM12 falls from 7.075 in Panel A to 2.228 in Panel B, a
68.51% decrease, and turnover improves from 0.374% to 0.636%, a
70.22% gain. There is a comparable improvement in SEO return-
to-volume, which falls from 1.857 to 0.821, a 55.79% reduction.
Nasdaq listed issuers experience the biggest liquidity gains post-is-
sue with c falling from 1.595 to 0.984, LM12 falling from 12.69 to
3.034, TR increasing from 0.592% to 0.923%, and RtoV falling from
3.378 to 1.049. The results in Table 3 show that SEOs improve their
liquidity following the offering and that size–B/M matching does
not control for SEO liquidity characteristics.
4.2. SEO return performance relative to liquidity matched control
stocks
Our results suggest that the increased liquidity of SEO stocks
may explain their low performance relative to size–B/M matched
stocks. We therefore test whether liquidity matching after the is-
sue equates SEO and control firm returns. Table 4 reports SEO
buy-and-hold abnormal returns relative to size–B/M matches and
post-issue LM12-matched control firms. We match on LM12 in
month m (m = 8, 12, and 18) after the offering to control for the
gradual improvement in SEO liquidity evident in Fig. 1 and we
examine post-matching SEO performance over the following
60mmonths. Missing liquidity characteristics in the matching
month lead to slight sample attrition. Issuing stocks underperform
size–B/M control stocks based on skewness adjusted t-statistics
and Jegadeesh and Karceski’s (2009) t-test over all three holding
periods (at 5%) for all portfolios using EW and the majority of port-
folios using VW. LM12 matching reduces BHARs using EW from
35.75% to 17.97% for the match made in month eight, from
28.3% to 13.25% for the match made in month twelve, and from
19.26% to 8.25% for the match made in month eighteen. Corre-
sponding increases in BHARs using VW are from 22.35% to
13.93%, from 17.7% to 10.89%, and from 10.63% to 0.67%.
Based on skewness adjusted t-statistics and the Jegadeesh–Karces-
ki t-test, SEOs do not underperform liquidity matched benchmarks
over any of the holding periods.10 Matching on c, TR, or RtoV also
shows less SEO underperformance than size–B/M matching.
4.3. What explains SEO liquidity gains after the issue?
We explore two explanations for increases in SEO liquidity after
the offering. First, an equity offering is likely to increase analyst
coverage. Previous studies show that issuing firms actively seek
analyst coverage and analyst coverage can form part of the under-
writing agreement (Krigman et al., 2001; Cliff and Denis, 2004).
Higher analyst following increases market visibility and improves
the amount and quality of information about the firm available
to investors (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Barron et al. 2002; Francis
et al., 2002). This in turn reduces information asymmetry and the
cost of trading with better informed investors, leading to higher
price informativeness and stock liquidity (Brennan and
Subrahmanyam, 1995; Hong et al., 2000; Irvine, 2003; Roulstone,
2003; Barth and Hutton, 2004; Chang et al., 2006).
Second, previous studies report a positive relation between insti-
tutional shareholding and stock liquidity (Falkenstein, 1996; Rubin,
2007; Agarwal, 2007). This is because (1) institutional investors
trade more often and trade larger share volumes, and (2) an in-
creased presence of institutional investors increases competition
among investors, improvingmarket efficiencyand reducing the like-
lihood of trading against a better informed counterparty.
To test these two propositions, we examine changes in analyst
following and in institutional holdings for 5 years before and after
the issue for SEOs and size–B/Mmatches. We calculate the number
of analysts following afirm,#Anal, as the number of analysts provid-
ing earnings forecasts for a firm, over all possible forecast horizons,
in the past 12 months including the currentmonth using data in the
IBES detail files. We exclude stocks not covered by IBES and assume
analyst coverage is zero if a stock is listed on IBES but has no analyst
following in the past 12 months including the current month.
Institutional holdings data are from the Thomson Reuters 13F
Holdings database (formerly CDA/Spectrum). The Securities and
Exchange Commission requires institutions that manage equity
in excess of $100 million to file (quarterly) form 13F, listing hold-
ings larger than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. At the
quarter-end, we calculate the number of institutions holding
shares in a firm, #Inst, and the total number of shares they hold.
To find the proportion of shares held by institutions, %SharesInst,
we scale total institutional shareholdings by the number of shares
outstanding from CRSP at the end of the reporting quarter.
Additional data requirements leave 2172 SEOs over 1985–2009.11
Table 4
The long-run performance of SEOs: liquidity matching.
Matching Holding period N Issuer (%) Match (%) Diff (%) T P t-JK p-JK
EW Size–B/M matching 8–60 4007 38.40 74.14 35.75 10.598 0.000 1.959 0.050
VW 43.89 66.24 22.35 12.874 0.000 2.425 0.015
EW LM12 matching 38.40 56.37 17.97 5.469 0.000 1.334 0.182
VW 43.89 57.82 13.93 6.509 0.000 1.136 0.256
EW Size–B/M matching 12–60 4006 38.47 66.77 28.30 8.701 0.000 1.957 0.050
VW 40.45 58.14 17.70 10.731 0.000 2.301 0.021
EW LM12 matching 38.47 51.71 13.25 4.040 0.000 1.231 0.218
VW 40.45 51.33 10.89 5.740 0.000 1.031 0.303
EW Size–B/M matching 18–60 3911 36.92 56.19 19.26 6.288 0.000 1.988 0.047
VW 40.60 51.23 10.63 6.408 0.000 1.621 0.105
EW LM12 matching 36.92 45.17 8.25 2.794 0.025 1.308 0.191
VW 40.60 39.93 0.67 0.314 0.185 0.040 0.968
The table reports the average 5-year BHRs of equity issuers (Issuer) and control firms (Match) matched on size and book-to-market (size–B/M matching) and post-issue LM12
(LM12 matching) using equal weighting (EW) and value weighting (VW). Diff is the difference between these figures. Holding period shows the holding period start and end
month. t is a two-sided skewness-adjusted t-statistic testing the hypothesis of no difference between the average long-run performance of issuers and their matches, p its p-
value, t-JK the (skewness-adjusted) test statistic for Jegadeesh and Karceski’s (2009) heteroskedasticity and correlation consistent t-test, with p-JK its corresponding p-value.
N is the number of offerings. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over time.
10 To check that our analysis of liquidity dynamics on a reduced sample is
representative of the full sample, we conduct two additional analyses. First, we
examine BHARs for the 3587 SEOs. Untabulated results show no significant
differences from results for the full sample in Table 2. Second, we replicate the
calendar time analysis of Section 5 below for the 3587 SEOs to investigate their
liquidity risk dynamics after the issue. The results for the reduced sample are
qualitatively similar to the main sample results, corroborating our findings.
11 IBES and Thomson Reuters 13F Holdings data start in 1980. To avoid data errors,
we exclude the first five years of data when calculating analyst following and
institutional holdings.
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4.3.1. The evolution of analyst following and institutional investor
holdings around SEOs
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of analyst following and institutional
investor shareholdings for SEO firms and their size–B/M matches
for 5 years before and after the issue. Table 5 reports the mean ana-
lyst following and institutional holdings of SEOs, size–B/M
matches, and tests their differences around the offering. The fol-
lowing section presents results of a regression analysis testing
whether changes in analyst following and institutional investor
holdings explain post-issue liquidity gains of SEO stocks.
Fig. 2a shows a pre-issue decline in analyst coverage, with the
average number of analysts covering SEO stocks decreasing from
9.27 five years before the issue to 7.65 six months before the issue.
However, #Anal increases sharply to 10 sixteen months after the
issue, a 30.7% increase. Analyst coverage levels out at 10.44 over
the remaining period. Analyst coverage of benchmark stocks de-
creases from 8.28 over the 5-years before the issue to 7.51 over
the 5-years after the issue. The results in Fig. 2a are consistent with
new equity issues attracting analyst coverage.
Fig. 2b shows that the number of institutional investors holding
SEO stock declines before the offering, falling from 85.99 five-years
before the issue to 73.16 twelve months before the issue. However,
similar to analyst following, #Inst increases to 87.28 one month be-
fore the issue and reaches a peak of 134.88 five-years after the issue.
Mean institutional holdings of size–B/M matches are 87.78 before
the issue and 96.09 after the issue. Fig. 2c reports the proportion
of SEO firm shares held by institutional investors. %SharesInst is
roughly constant around 40–41% up to 12 months before the issue.
It increases from 40.1% twelve months before the issue to 53.6%
twelve months after the issue, a 33.6% increase, and levels off at
55.6% over the remaining period. The stake held by institutional
investors in size–B/M matches is 41.8% before the issue and 47.8%
after. Together, Figs. 2b and c suggest that share issues attract insti-
tutional investors, who become the dominant shareholders after
the offering. The results in Fig. 2 are consistent with Gibson et al.
(2004), who find an increase in institutional holdings in SEO firms
in the four quarters after the SEO, and Lin and Wu (2010), who also
report an increase in SEO institutional holdings and analyst cover-
age after the issue.
Table 5 shows the mean analyst following and institutional
holdings of SEOs, size–B/M matches, and their differences around
the offering. Panel A shows the results for the 5-year pre-issue per-
iod. Compared to size–B/M matches, SEOs have higher analyst fol-
lowing before the issue and a greater percentage of institutional
ownership. NYSE/AMEX listed SEOs have higher analyst following
and institutional holdings than Nasdaq listed issuers, consistent
with Falkenstein’s (1996) findings that institutional investors pre-
fer to hold larger and more liquid stocks.
Table 5, Panel B reports mean analyst coverage and institutional
investor holdings of SEOs, size–B/M matches, and their differences
for the 5-year post-issue period. Analyst coverage of SEO stocks in-
creases from 8.288 before the issue to 10.117 after the issue, and
the difference in analyst coverage of SEOs compared to benchmark
stocks increases from 0.342 to 2.644. Analyst following of bench-
mark stocks decreases after the issue. The number of institutional
investors holding SEO stock increases from 79.402 before the issue
to 110.048 after the issue, a 38.6% gain. The percentage of SEO firm
shares held by institutional investors increases from 42.12% before
the issue to 55.17% after the issue, a 30.99% increase. Benchmark
stocks show only a 14.29% increase in institutional holdings. The
difference in institutional investor ownership of SEOs compared
to size–B/M matches after the offering increases from 0.62% before
the issue to 7.74% after the issue. The increase in SEO analyst cov-
erage and institutional holdings compared to benchmark stocks
after the issue mirrors the SEO liquidity gains compared to size–
B/M matches in Table 3. Further, Nasdaq issuers experience the
largest increase in analyst coverage after the issue (an increase of
60.96%) and institutional holdings (#Inst increases by 81.09%
and%SharesInst by 44.12%), consistent with the higher liquidity
gains for Nasdaq listed SEOs in Table 3.
4.3.2. Liquidity gains and changes in analyst following and
institutional investor holdings around SEOs
To test formally whether changes in analyst following and insti-
tutional investor holdings explain post-issue SEO liquidity gains,
we estimate the following regression
LiqGaini ¼ a0 þ a1D#Anali þ a2D%SharesInsti þ a3D#Insti
þ a4%NewSharesi þ a5B=Mi þ a6 lnMV i þ a7Hoti
þ a8Nasdaqi þ ei ð5Þ
where LiqGaini is the change in one of the four liquidity measures
from Table 3 in the 5-year post-issue period for SEO firm i. Changes
in c, RtoV, and LM12 are multiplied by 1 so that positive values of
LiqGain reflect SEO liquidity increases after the issue. D#Anal,
D%SharesInst, and D#Inst are the changes, in percentage, in analyst
coverage, institutional holdings, and numbers of institutions from
before to after the issue, and %NewShares is the proportion of (pri-
mary and secondary) shares issued relative to the number of shares
outstanding 1 month before the offering. The book-to-market ratio
is for the fiscal year 2 years before the offering if an issue takes place
in the first 6 months of a year, and for the previous fiscal year for
issues in the second 6 months of the year. Market capitalization is
measured 1 month before the offering and scaled by the CRSP stock
market index to give comparability over time. Hot and Nasdaq are
Fig. 2. Evolution of analyst coverage and institutional shareholding for a sample of
SEOs and their size–B/M matched control stocks. (a) The average number of
analysts following a firm, #Anal. (b) The average number of institutional investors
holding SEO stock, #Inst. (c) The average proportion of common shares held by
institutional investors, %SharesInst. The figures report the end of month character-
istics for a sample of 2172 SEOs (SEO) and their size–B/M matched control stocks
(Match) for the 5-year periods before and after the issue.
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1–0 indicator variables for hot-issue periods and for Nasdaq listings.
We winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 1% of values.
Table 6 shows the results of estimating model (5). For ease of
exposition, the coefficients when c is the liquidity measure are
multiplied by 103. We find a positive association between SEO
liquidity gains and changes in analyst following and in the (per-
centage) institutional investor ownership of SEOs (D%SharesInst)
for the majority of the liquidity measures. The increase in the num-
ber of institutional investors holding SEO stock after the offering,
D#Inst, is positively associated with stock turnover. With the
exception of stock turnover, larger equity offerings relative to the
pre-issue number of shares outstanding increase SEO stock liquid-
ity. Value firms and smaller firms have greater liquidity gains. Nas-
daq listed SEOs experience larger gains with respect to c and
stock turnover. Overall, the results in Table 6 show that post-issue
SEO liquidity gains are associated with increases in analyst cover-
age and institutional investor holdings.
5. Calendar time analysis
Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), Perez-Quiros and Timmer-
mann (2000), and Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) challenge the no-
tion that firm characteristics drive expected stock returns. A
calendar time analysis allows us to examine whether a factor mod-
el can explain low SEO long-run performance. Fama (1998) and
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate the calendar time approach
as being less susceptible to bad model problems as it does not com-
pound spurious abnormal returns. It also poses fewer statistical
problems (less skewness and kurtosis) and adjusts directly for
Table 5
Analyst coverage and institutional holdings of SEOs and their matches before and after the issue.
Portfolio N Issuer Match Diff. P
Panel A. 5-year analyst coverage and institutional investor holdings before the offering
#Anal All exchanges 2172 8.288 7.946 0.342 0.000
%SharesInst 42.12% 41.50% 0.62% 0.000
#Inst 79.402 83.931 4.529 0.000
#Anal NYSE/AMEX 848 11.941 11.350 0.591 0.000
%SharesInst 49.23% 48.02% 1.21% 0.000
#Inst 123.814 127.215 3.401 0.000
#Anal Nasdaq 1324 5.017 4.899 0.119 0.000
%SharesInst 35.75% 35.66% 0.09% 0.635
#Inst 39.645 45.184 5.539 0.000
Panel B. 5-year analyst coverage and institutional investor holdings after the offering
#Anal All exchanges 2172 10.117 7.473 2.644 0.000
%SharesInst 55.17% 47.43% 7.74% 0.000
#Inst 110.048 94.737 15.311 0.000
#Anal NYSE/AMEX 848 13.103 10.387 2.715 0.000
%SharesInst 60.50% 54.32% 6.19% 0.000
#Inst 166.004 144.457 21.547 0.000
#Anal Nasdaq 1324 8.076 5.481 2.595 0.000
%SharesInst 51.52% 42.72% 8.80% 0.000
#Inst 71.793 60.746 11.047 0.000
The table reports mean analyst following and institutional investor stockholdings of SEOs (Issuer) and their size–B/M benchmarks (Match) over 1985–2009. #Anal is the
number of analysts providing earnings forecasts, over all possible forecast horizons, in the past 12 months including the current month. #Inst is the total number of
institutions holding stock in a firm. %SharesInst is the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. Diff is the mean difference between these values and p the
corresponding p-value. N is the number of observations. Panel A shows the results for the 5-year period before the offering, Panel B for the 5-year post-offering period.
Table 6
Regression analysis of post-issue SEO liquidity gains.
c TR LM12 RtoV
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p
Intercept 6.405 0.000 0.081 0.191 17.168 0.000 2.648 0.000
D#Anal 0.202 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.172 0.043 0.063 0.002
D%SharesInst 7.789 0.000 0.611 0.000 0.263 0.893 1.029 0.027
D#Inst 0.005 0.258 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.491 0.002 0.361
%NewShares 2.258 0.027 0.066 0.314 8.389 0.000 2.091 0.000
B/M 0.502 0.045 0.044 0.007 3.110 0.000 0.395 0.003
ln MV 1.123 0.000 0.008 0.433 2.971 0.000 0.493 0.000
Hot 0.159 0.584 0.019 0.303 1.098 0.089 0.141 0.358
Nasdaq 2.304 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.663 0.361 0.048 0.782
N 2172 2172 2172 2172
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj. R2 0.206 0.218 0.142 0.092
The table reports estimates (Estimate) from regressions of post-issue SEO liquidity gains, measured as the change in each of four liquidity characteristics in the 5-year post- vs.
pre-issue period. The liquidity characteristics are the effective cost of trading (c), share turnover (TR), which is the daily number of shares traded divided by the number of
shares outstanding on the day averaged over the prior 12 months, Liu’s (2006) liquidity measure (LM12), and return-to-volume (RtoV), which is the absolute daily return
divided by the dollar denominated trading volume on the day averaged over the prior 12 months.D#Anal is the change in the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts
for a firm in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period. D#Inst is the change in the total number of institutions holding stock in a firm in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period.
D%SharesInst is the change in the proportion of stock held by institutional investors in the 5-year post- vs. pre-issue period.%NewShares is the proportion of (primary and
secondary) shares issued by the firm relative to the total number of shares outstanding 1 month before the offering. B/M is the book-to-market ratio and MV is market
capitalization. Hot and Nasdaq are indicator variables for hot-issue periods and for an SEO listing on Nasdaq. All variables are measured over 1985–2009. N is the number of
observations, p the associated p-value, and Adj R2 is the adjusted R-squared.
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cross-sectional correlation. The intercept (alpha) of a calendar time
regression estimates the mean monthly abnormal return.
Wefirst replicate previous evidence onSEO calendar timeperfor-
mance in FF3FMregressionswith a5-yearholdingperiod. Table7 re-
ports alphas and factor loadings from regressing equal and value
weighted SEO portfolio excess returns on the three factors, using
the main sample of 4446 SEOs. We require at least 10 stocks in a
monthly calendar time portfolio to ensure that a few stocks do not
unduly influence the parameter estimates and to limit heteroske-
dasticity of theportfolio residual variance.12 This restricts the sample
period to April 1970–December 2009.
In general, SEO returns covary positively with each of the three
factors, although Nasdaq SEOs load negatively on HML. The pooled
sample alpha is 0.246% using EW and 0.344% using VW, and
Nasdaq SEOs have more negative alphas than NYSE/AMEX SEOs.
All alphas using EW are significant at 5% and all alphas using VW
are significant at 10%.13 Overall, after adjusting for the three
Fama–French factors, SEO firms show significantly negative
performance.
5.1. Tests based on liquidity augmented asset pricing models
To assess the explanatory power of liquidity risk for post-SEO
performance, we initially use Liu’s (2006) LCAPM.14 The LCAPM
consists of the market factor, MKT, and a liquidity risk factor, LIQ
EðRi  Rf Þ ¼ bmiEðMKTÞ þ bliEðLIQÞ ð6Þ
The market factor is the standard excess return on the market
over the risk-free rate. We construct LIQ based on LM12 as Liu
(2010) shows that LM12 captures multiple liquidity dimensions
and it generates a more robust premium than bid-ask spread, Has-
brouck’s c, the number of zero daily returns, stock turnover, and re-
turn-to-volume. Specifically, due to inconsistent trading volume
records, we separately sort NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks at the
end of each month based on LM12 and form two portfolios. One is
a low liquidity portfolio, LL, containing the highest LM12 NYSE/
AMEX stocks, based on a 15% NYSE breakpoint, and the 35% highest
LM12 Nasdaq stocks. The other is a high liquidity portfolio, HL, con-
taining the lowest LM12 NYSE/AMEX stocks, based on a 35% NYSE
breakpoint, and the 15% lowest LM12 Nasdaq stocks. The two port-
folios are equally-weighted and held for 6 months after portfolio
formation. The liquidity risk factor, LIQ, is constructed as the
monthly profits from buying one dollar of LL and selling one dollar
of HL. Model (6) excludes SMB and HML because distress risk prox-
ied by these two factors is a source of stock illiquidity. Thus, liquid-
ity risk should capture distress risk more directly. Liu (2006) shows
that model (6) not only explains the TR and LM12 premiums, which
the FF3FM model does not, but it also accounts for market anoma-
lies associated with size, book-to-market, cash-flow-to-price, earn-
ings-to-price, dividend yield, and long-term contrarian investment.
To explore the source of SEO firms’ negative FF3FM alphas in
Table 7 and whether liquidity risk can explain SEO performance,
as a first step, Table 8 reports the distribution of SEO firms across
different liquidity groups and presents the performance of alterna-
tive asset pricing models in explaining returns of liquidity-sorted
portfolios. We classify stocks into LM12 deciles at the end of each
year from 1969 to 2008 and calculate decomposed portfolio buy-
and-hold returns for the next 12 months using EW (Liu and Strong,
2008).15
The first row of Table 8 shows the mean value of LM12 for each
portfolio, from the lowest liquidity portfolio, LL, to the highest
liquidity portfolio, HL. The second row reports the proportion of
firms within each liquidity decile that make an SEO in the follow-
ing 12 months. This proportion increases almost monotonically
from portfolio LL to portfolio HL, with the proportion within the
two highest liquidity deciles being 9.5%, compared with 0.7% for
the two lowest liquidity deciles. The fact that this proportion is
far from uniform across the deciles indicates the relevance of
liquidity.
The next four rows of Table 8 report the alphas and associated
p-values from FF3FM and LCAPM regressions of the monthly decile
portfolio returns. The FF3FM alpha is large and negative for the
Table 7
Calendar time regressions of SEO returns on the Fama–French three-factors.
Portfolio T Parameter EW VW
Estimate p Adj. R2 Estimate p Adj. R2
All exchanges 477 a 0.246% 0.007 0.912 0.344% 0.001 0.847
MKT 1.126 0.000 1.128 0.000
SMB 0.736 0.000 0.097 0.003
HML 0.129 0.000 0.347 0.000
NYSE/AMEX 476 a 0.297% 0.001 0.882 0.399% 0.000 0.832
MKT 1.102 0.000 1.106 0.000
SMB 0.470 0.000 0.024 0.538
HML 0.441 0.000 0.490 0.000
Nasdaq 412 a 0.312% 0.010 0.896 0.305% 0.072 0.814
MKT 1.206 0.000 1.311 0.000
SMB 0.965 0.000 0.656 0.000
HML 0.095 0.023 0.175 0.003
The table reports estimates (Estimate) from calendar time regressions of SEO returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors from April 1970 to December 2009.MKT is
the market excess return, SMB is the average return on a portfolio long in small (S) and short in big (B) stocks controlling for book-to-market. HML is the average return on a
portfolio long in high (H) and short in low (L) book-to-market stocks controlling for size. T is the length of the time series in months, p denotes p-values, and Adj R2 is the
adjusted R-squared. EW denotes equal weighting and VW value weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index
to give comparability over time.
12 The average number of stocks in a calendar time portfolio is 501 per month,
which on average produces homoscedastic standard errors. However, we correct test
statistics for heteroskedasticity in Tables 7–13 whenever White’s (1980) model
specification test rejects the null of homoscedasticity.
13 The pooled sample alpha is a non-linear combination of the exchange regression
alphas and includes the diversification effect of pooling stocks across the two
exchanges. The pooled sample alpha also adjusts for constraining the factor loadings
to average values across the exchanges. For example, the higher pooled alpha adjusts
for the HML loading in the pooled regression being over three times lower than for
NYSE/AMEX issuers.
14 Section 6.3 reports robustness tests using other liquidity risk model
specifications.
15 We discuss the decomposed buy-and-hold returns method of Liu and Strong
(2008) in detail in Section 6.2. Our conclusions are qualitatively the same using
traditional calendar time portfolio analysis.
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most liquid decile, HL, which contains the highest proportion of
SEOs, suggesting the reason for the negative SEO FF3FM alphas in
Table 7. In contrast, the LCAPM alphas are insignificant across all
liquidity deciles.
We also estimate Eckbo and Norli’s (2005) model, minus the
momentum factor, and report alphas for this model and associated
p-values in the last two rows of Table 8.16 This four factor model
eliminates the negative performance of the most liquid decile, HL,
but, similar to the FF3FM, it underprices the low liquidity deciles LL,
L2, and L3.
The results in Table 8 confirm that the LCAPM explains the
time-series returns of liquidity-sorted portfolios. In contrast, the
FF3FM overprices the most liquid stocks, offering a potential expla-
nation for previous findings of low SEO performance using a FF3FM
benchmark. The FF3FM augmented by Eckbo and Norli’s (2005)
liquidity factor fails to price low liquidity portfolios.
5.2. Liquidity risk as an explanation for low post-SEO performance
To examine whether (1) liquidity risk can explain post-SEO
stock price performance and (2) if SEOs experience a reduction in
liquidity risk exposure, we estimate the following calendar-time
regression over 5 years before and after the equity issue
Table 8
Regressing liquidity portfolio returns on alternative asset pricing models.
LL L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 HL
Mean LM12 111.774 47.590 21.552 9.242 3.475 0.974 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000
SEOs as% of portfolio 0.20% 0.52% 0.88% 1.61% 2.39% 2.58% 2.48% 2.85% 3.90% 5.57%
LCAPM a 0.038% 0.059% 0.049% 0.020% 0.091% 0.002% 0.158% 0.183% 0.107% 0.110%
p 0.797 0.724 0.782 0.903 0.503 0.990 0.158 0.262 0.602 0.629
FF3FM a 0.416% 0.322% 0.236% 0.085% 0.121% 0.110% 0.015% 0.011% 0.143% 0.479%
p 0.003 0.010 0.044 0.383 0.228 0.196 0.836 0.901 0.211 0.000
FF3FM + LMH a 0.372% 0.343% 0.224% 0.073% 0.165% 0.094% 0.095% 0.126% 0.090% 0.101%
p 0.008 0.008 0.064 0.468 0.125 0.283 0.288 0.140 0.532 0.373
The table reports intercepts from calendar time regressions of equally weighted returns to ten liquidity portfolios on Liu’s (2006) LCAPM (LCAPM a), the Fama and French
(1993) model (FF3FM a), and the FF3FM with an LMH liquidity factor (FF3FM + LMH a) from January 1970 to December 2009. Liquidity deciles are sorted from lowest (LL) to
highest (HL) liquidity. Specifically, at year-end, we sort all CRSP stocks into deciles on LM12 and calculate equally weighted portfolio returns for the next 12 months using Liu
and Strong’s (2008) decomposed buy-and-hold returns method. Portfolio returns are adjusted for delisting returns. The liquidity factor in Liu (2006) is the difference in
average returns between portfolios of low and high liquidity stocks based on LM12. LMH is the turnover-based liquidity factor of Eckbo and Norli (2005) and is the average
return difference between a portfolio long in low turnover stocks and short in high turnover stocks controlling for firm size. Size quintiles are from smallest (Small) to biggest
(Big) capitalization stocks and book-to-market quintiles are ordered from low (Low B/M) to high (High B/M).Mean LM12 is the mean value of LM12 for the portfolio. SEOs as% of
portfolio is the percentage of portfolio constituents that make an SEO in the following 12 months. p Denotes p-values.
Table 9
Liquidity risk and the long-run performance of SEOs: calendar time analysis.
Portfolio T Parameter EW VW
Estimate p Adj. R2 Estimate p Adj. R2
All exchanges 955 a0 1.357% 0.000 0.782 0.918% 0.000 0.837
a1 1.387% 0.000 1.016% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.030% 0.904 0.098% 0.624
MKT 1.253 0.000 1.001 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.058 0.284 0.034 0.377
LIQ 0.141 0.004 0.040 0.236
LIQ  DSEO 0.237 0.001 0.106 0.026
NYSE/AMEX 952 a0 0.751% 0.000 0.793 0.603% 0.000 0.783
a1 0.850% 0.000 0.812% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.099% 0.641 0.209% 0.284
MKT 1.174 0.000 0.976 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.035 0.446 0.053 0.212
LIQ 0.302 0.000 0.137 0.000
LIQ  DSEO 0.217 0.000 0.062 0.244
Nasdaq 795 a0 2.152% 0.000 0.698 2.769% 0.000 0.731
a1 2.152% 0.000 2.625% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.000% 0.999 0.144% 0.713
MKT 1.378 0.000 1.293 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.107 0.220 0.090 0.300
LIQ 0.061 0.403 0.326 0.000
LIQ  DSEO 0.265 0.011 0.120 0.247
The table reports coefficients (Estimate) from calendar time LCAPM regressions for SEOs for 5 years before and after the issue. The regression takes the form
Rpt  Rft ¼ ap;0 þ ap;1  DSEO þ ðbmp;0 þ bmp;1  DSEOÞMKT t þ ðblp;0 þ blp;1  DSEOÞLIQ t þ ept where the 0 and 1 subscripts indicate estimates for the pre- and post-issue periods
and DSEO is an indicator variable for the post-issue period. MKT is the market excess return and LIQ is the difference in average returns between portfolios of low and high
liquidity stocks based on LM12. p denotes p-values, Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared, and T is the length of the time series in months. EW stands for equal weighting and VW
for value weighting of calendar time portfolios. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP stock market index to give comparability over
time.
16 To create their liquidity factor, LMH, we follow Eckbo and Norli (2005) and sort all
NYSE/AMEX stocks into two portfolios based on market value of equity and three
portfolios based on stock turnover at each year-end, and calculate monthly portfolio
returns using VW for the next twelve months. LMH is the difference in equally
weighted returns on the two low turnover portfolios (L) and the two high turnover
portfolios (H). Portfolios are rebalanced in December each year. Over January 1970–
December 2009, LMH has a mean value of 0.284% and a correlation of 0.662 with LIQ.
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Rpt  Rft ¼ ap;0 þ ap;1  DSEO þ ðbmp;0 þ bmp;1  DSEOÞMKT t
þ ðblp;0 þ blp;1  DSEOÞLIQ t þ ept : ð7Þ
The 0 and 1 subscripts indicate estimates for the pre- and post-
issue periods, and DSEO equals 1 for the post-issue period and 0
otherwise. If the LCAPM explains SEO post-issue performance,
ap,0 + ap,1 should be zero.
17 Lower post-offering liquidity risk implies
blp,1 < 0.
Table 9, Panel A reports the coefficients from LCAPM calendar
time portfolio regressions using the same SEOs as in Table 7. EW
(VW) denotes equally (value) weighted returns on calendar-time
portfolios. Consistent with previous evidence (Bayless and Jay,
2003), we find strong pre-issue SEO abnormal performance of
1.357% using EW and 0.918% using VW. But we find no evidence
of post-issue negative abnormal performance based on the LCAPM,
with ap,0 + ap,1 insignificantly different from zero for SEO portfolios
using both EW and VW. Further, all LIQ factor loadings are lower
after the issue using EW and for the VW pooled sample. The reduc-
tion in liquidity risk exposure across all SEOs is 0.237 using EW
and 0.106 using VW. Given an average monthly liquidity pre-
mium over 1970–2009 of 0.615%, these liquidity loadings lower
the pooled SEO expected returns by 0.146% per month using
EW and by 0.065% per month using VW. The post-issue fall in
liquidity risk is higher for Nasdaq than for NYSE/AMEX stocks. To-
gether, this confirms a reduction in SEO liquidity risk exposure
after the issue and complements the results on the evolution of
liquidity characteristics in Fig. 1 and Table 3. Controlling for lower
liquidity risk, the regression results show no evidence of a reduc-
tion in market risk post-SEO, indicating that the previous finding
on the low post-SEO performance is due to liquidity risk.
A diversification effect in calendar time portfolios may explain
the zero LCAPM alphas in Table 9. To test if our method of applying
a calendar time analysis affects our inferences, we estimate the
LCAPM for individual SEO stocks. Following Lin and Wu (2010)
we estimate regression (7) for each SEO firm where the regression
spans the period 5 years before and after the equity issue and we
require at least six observations before and after the issue for each
SEO to estimate the model, which eliminates two SEOs from the
sample.18Table 10, Panel A reports cross-section average regression
estimates across 4444 SEOs.19 EW denotes equally-weighted aver-
ages and VW value-weighted. Consistent with Table 9, there is no
evidence of post-issue negative abnormal performance based on
the LCAPM, with ai,0 + ai,1 insignificant for SEO portfolios using both
EW and VW. Also, for all SEO portfolios, LIQ loadings are negative
after the issue, consistent with the reduction in liquidity risk expo-
sure. The reductions across all SEOs are 0.287 using EW and
0.087 using VW, and are similar in magnitude to the calendar-time
estimates in Table 9.
The event-time analysis shows a reduction in SEO market sen-
sitivities. Lower MKT betas after the issue are consistent with Carl-
son et al. (2010), who argue that exercising growth options reduces
SEO market risk. However, the post-issue reduction in market risk
is too small to explain low long-run SEO performance. For example,
for the pooled sample using EW, lower market risk reduces post-is-
sue monthly expected returns by 0.082% (0.190  0.429%) com-
pared to a 0.177% reduction attributable to lower liquidity risk.
Overall, the LCAPM estimates show that lower liquidity risk expo-
sures explain issuers’ post-issue performance.
Table 10, Panel B repeats the regressions using the FF3FM. This
model fails to explain post-issue SEO returns and produces
significantly negative a0 + a1 values for all SEO portfolios, with the
exception of the VW Nasdaq portfolio, where the estimate is nega-
tive but insignificant. Consistent with Table 7, the magnitude of
SEO underperformance is higher for EW than VW portfolios and
higher for EWNasdaq than for EWNYSE/AMEX listed equity issuers.
Untabulated results show that SEO pre-issue abnormal return
estimates from the LCAPM (1.657% for EW and 0.914% for VW) are
indistinguishable from the FF3FM estimates (1.531% for EW and
0.788% for VW). The evidence of pre-SEO outperformance from both
models is consistent with previous findings (Ritter, 2003; Bayless
and Jay, 2003; Carlson et al., 2010). SEO pre-issue outperformance
is, however, not evidence against an asset pricing model as an SEO
event-based trading strategy cannot earn the pre-SEO return.
Table 10, Panel C summarizes the results on SEO abnormal per-
formance and risk changes from Panels A and B and provides fur-
ther details of their cross-section distribution. Overall, the results
in Table 10 reinforce the liquidity risk explanation of the low
SEO return performance after the offering.
Finally, we examine whether size–B/M matching captures SEO
liquidity features. We calculate returns for a zero-investment port-
folio long in issuers and short in benchmark stocks, and regress
these on the LCAPM. Untabulated results show that the zero-
investment portfolio has a significantly negative LIQ loading for
all portfolios using EW and for the portfolio of Nasdaq issuers using
VW. Further, the liquidity risk mismatch is higher for Nasdaq than
for NYSE/AMEX listed SEOs. This evidence indicates that two-
dimensional matching on size–B/M does not guarantee that the
benchmark’s risk sensitivity captures the covariance structure of
SEO returns. Stocks with large differences in liquidity characteris-
tics also tend to have large differences in LIQ sensitivities.
In summary, SEOs improve their liquidity following the offering,
which reduces their exposure to liquidity risk and explains their
post-offering performance. Size–B/M matching compares returns
of high-liquidity issuers with returns of low-liquidity benchmark
stocks, leading to benchmark bias. As buy-and-hold returns com-
pound any risk mismatch over the holding period, it is easy to mis-
interpret the bias as SEO underperformance.
6. Robustness tests
Particular research design choices may drive our previous re-
sults. Averaging SEO returns across samples can dilute the under-
performance effect if it is confined to a particular stock grouping.
Monthly rebalancing of calendar time portfolios involves excessive
transaction costs and does not correspond to an investor’s experi-
ence when investing in event firms. Finally, our results could be
due to the choice of liquidity augmented asset pricing model. To
address these concerns, we run several robustness tests.
6.1. SEO long-run performance: Subsample results
Table 11, Panels A–C analyze the performance of SEOs across
several sub-samples: three industry groups, two equity issue types
(primary shares and combinations of secondary and equity sale by
a major shareholder), and nine Fama and French size and B/M port-
folios. Panel C examines hot vs. cold periods, as Loughran and Rit-
ter (2000) report greater SEO underperformance during hot issue
periods, and interpret this as evidence of time-varying misvalua-
tion. Panel D examines SEOs within and outside a 5-year period
after an IPO to gauge the sensitivity of our results to low post-
IPO performance. Panel E investigates 12-, 24-, 36-, and 48-month
holding periods, while Panel F examines equity issues during
1970–2001 and 2002–2004 to test if poor stock returns during
17 The term is equivalent to the post-issue alpha from FF3FM calendar time
regressions in Table 7.
18 The results are robust to using a minimum of 18 observations before and after the
issue for each SEO.
19 All significance tests in Table 10 are based on standard errors clustered on the
issue month to correct for SEO clustering in event time.
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the 2007–2009 financial crisis affects our results. Table 11 shows
that regression alphas are insignificant in every single case, show-
ing that the LCAPM captures the performance of SEOs across these
sub-samples.
Table 11, Panel H shows LCAPM estimates for SEO portfolios
formed 3 and 6 months after the issue. This serves to distinguish
between short- and long-term liquidity improvements after the
offering. For example, (short-term) underwriter price-stabilization
Table 10
Liquidity risk and the long-run performance of SEOs: firm-level regressions.
Portfolio N Parameter EW VW
Estimate p Adj. R2 Estimate p Adj. R2
Panel A. Regression of individual SEO returns on the liquidity augmented CAPM
All exchanges 4444 a0 1.657% 0.000 0.225 0.914% 0.000 0.225
a1 1.629% 0.000 0.906% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.027% 0.644 0.008% 0.888
MKT 1.268 0.000 1.059 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.190 0.000 0.079 0.008
LIQ 0.130 0.001 0.055 0.042
LIQ  DSEO 0.287 0.000 0.087 0.021
NYSE/AMEX 1995 a0 0.874% 0.000 0.254 0.606% 0.000 0.331
a1 0.840% 0.000 0.617% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.034% 0.511 0.011% 0.833
MKT 1.172 0.000 1.019 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.128 0.000 0.058 0.072
LIQ 0.260 0.000 0.099 0.001
LIQ  DSEO 0.236 0.000 0.074 0.069
Nasdaq 2449 a0 2.294% 0.000 0.201 2.897% 0.000 0.271
a1 2.272% 0.000 2.770% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.022% 0.822 0.128% 0.555
MKT 1.346 0.000 1.318 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.241 0.000 0.217 0.001
LIQ 0.024 0.671 0.229 0.001
LIQ  DSEO 0.329 0.000 0.170 0.011
Panel B. Regression of individual SEO returns on the FF3FM
All exchanges 4444 a0 1.531% 0.000 0.287 0.788% 0.000 0.387
a1 1.700% 0.000 0.907% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.169% 0.000 0.120% 0.024
MKT 1.134 0.000 1.065 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.007 0.735 0.025 0.322
LIQ 0.965 0.000 0.150 0.000
LIQ  DSEO 0.151 0.000 0.056 0.074
HML 0.051 0.112 0.136 0.000
HML  DSEO 0.032 0.342 0.072 0.099
NYSE/AMEX 1995 a0 0.768% 0.000 0.319 0.515% 0.000 0.397
a1 0.870% 0.000 0.619% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.102% 0.041 0.104% 0.025
MKT 1.050 0.000 1.030 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.013 0.461 0.020 0.445
LIQ 0.654 0.000 0.037 0.248
LIQ  DSEO 0.109 0.000 0.031 0.373
HML 0.284 0.000 0.214 0.000
HML  DSEO 0.032 0.372 0.067 0.164
Nasdaq 2449 a0 2.152% 0.000 0.261 2.548% 0.000 0.326
a1 2.376% 0.000 2.767% 0.000
a0 + a1 0.224% 0.003 0.220% 0.301
MKT 1.202 0.000 1.293 0.000
MKT  DSEO 0.024 0.509 0.052 0.370
LIQ 1.219 0.000 0.880 0.000
LIQ  DSEO 0.185 0.000 0.216 0.002
HML 0.139 0.005 0.368 0.000
HML  DSEO 0.032 0.535 0.101 0.169
Model Weight N Mean SE Median Q1 Q3
Panel C. The cross-section distribution of post-issue SEO abnormal performance, and risk changes
LCAPM EW a0 + a1 0.027% 0.059% 0.091% 1.105% 1.286%
MKT  DSEO 0.190 0.036 0.127 0.822 0.463
LIQ  DSEO 0.287 0.039 0.184 1.107 0.565
VW a0 + a1 0.008% 0.055% 0.021% 0.615% 0.557%
MKT  DSEO 0.079 0.030 0.057 0.405 0.294
LIQ  DSEO 0.087 0.037 0.091 0.479 0.433
FF3FM EW a0 + a1 0.169% 0.046% 0.060% 1.133% 0.992%
MKT  DSEO 0.007 0.022 0.014 0.505 0.525
SMB  DSEO 0.151 0.029 0.115 0.889 0.592
HML  DSEO 0.032 0.034 0.016 0.821 0.885
VW a0 + a1 0.120% 0.053% 0.131% 0.619% 0.499%
MKT  DSEO 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.371 0.306
SMB  DSEO 0.056 0.031 0.007 0.461 0.390
HML  DSEO 0.072 0.043 0.040 0.410 0.516
Panel A reports average parameter estimates (Estimate) from individual SEO regressions for 5 years before and after the issue. The regression takes the form
Rit  Rft ¼ ai;0 þ ai;1  DSEO þ ðbmi;0 þ bmi;1  DSEOÞMKTt þ ðbli;0 þ bli;1  DSEOÞLIQ t þ eit ,where the 0 and 1 subscripts indicate estimates for the pre- and post-issue periods and
DSEO is an indicator variable for the post-issue period.MKT is the market excess return and LIQ is the difference in average returns between portfolios of low and high liquidity
stocks based on LM12. p denotes average p-values based on standard errors clustered on the issue month to correct for SEO clustering in event time. Adj.R2 is the average
adjusted R-squared, and N is the number of SEOs. Panel B repeats the analysis for the FF3FM (Fama and French 1993). Panel C presents the cross-section distribution of post-
issue SEO abnormal performance, a0 þ a1 , and changes in risk exposure from the liquidity augmented CAPM (LCAPM) and FF3FM regressions. EW denotes that averages
equally weight the individual SEO estimates and VW denotes that averages value weight the individual SEO estimates. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the
value-weighted CRSP stock market index to ensure comparability over time. Mean and Median denote mean and median values, SE denotes standard errors clustered on the
issue month, and Q1 and Q3 are the upper and lower quartiles.
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activity after the issue may temporarily increase SEO stock
liquidity, but the increased stock liquidity may disappear once
price support is withdrawn (Benveniste et al., 1996, 1998).20 We
find that SEO portfolios formed 3 and 6 months after the offering
load negatively on LIQ, which suggests that post-SEO liquidity gains
extend beyond the immediate period after the SEO.
6.2. Decomposed buy-and-hold returns
Liu and Strong (2008) criticize portfolios formed with the fre-
quent rebalancing implicit in standard calendar time portfolios
and point out that monthly rebalancing is inconsistent with a mul-
ti-month holding period strategy and involves prohibitive transac-
tion costs. We apply their technique to decompose long-term SEO
portfolio buy-and-hold returns to a monthly frequency.21 This
transfers the integrity of a buy-and-hold investment strategy to cal-
endar time and directly adjusts for cross-sectional correlation. An
investor incurs transaction costs only twice, at the beginning and
end of the 5-year holding period, compared with the monthly trans-
action costs implicit in the standard calendar time approach.
We apply the decomposed buy-and-hold return approach as
follows. Every 6 months we form a portfolio of all stocks issuing
Table 11
Calendar time robustness checks: subsample analysis.
Group T Parameter EW VW
Estimate p Adj. R2 Estimate P Adj. R2
Panel A. Industry classification of SEOs
Industry 475 a 0.063% 0.722 0.766 0.037% 0.770 0.837
Finance 373 a 0.334% 0.102 0.654 0.354% 0.236 0.552
Utility 466 a 0.183% 0.248 0.466 0.082% 0.650 0.365
Panel B. Type of equity offering
Combination 465 a 0.146% 0.439 0.748 0.114% 0.473 0.803
Primary 476 a 0.051% 0.717 0.776 0.097% 0.417 0.790
Panel C. Fama and French size and book-to-market portfolios.
FF S–L 457 a 0.143% 0.588 0.638 0.017% 0.950 0.648
FF S–M 458 a 0.153% 0.486 0.669 0.080% 0.718 0.688
FF S–H 436 a 0.050% 0.818 0.607 0.148% 0.498 0.630
FF Me–L 452 a 0.061% 0.728 0.766 0.034% 0.854 0.755
FF Me–M 457 a 0.042% 0.781 0.737 0.083% 0.623 0.692
FF Me–H 382 a 0.009% 0.960 0.723 0.079% 0.692 0.701
FF B–L 433 a 0.097% 0.474 0.823 0.021% 0.873 0.793
FF B–M 445 a 0.004% 0.983 0.645 0.049% 0.780 0.617
FF B–H 378 a 0.099% 0.635 0.525 0.119% 0.584 0.406
Panel D. Hot vs cold issuing period
Hot 477 a 0.046% 0.773 0.766 0.065% 0.586 0.807
Cold 464 a 0.016% 0.913 0.776 0.147% 0.369 0.716
Panel E. Age of the issuer
Age < 5 years 463 a 0.093% 0.637 0.747 0.113% 0.605 0.747
AgeP 5 years 477 a 0.008% 0.952 0.803 0.110% 0.353 0.787
Panel F. 12-, 24-, 36-, and 42-month holding period
12 Months 430 a 0.169% 0.348 0.777 0.116% 0.321 0.828
24 Months 442 a 0.085% 0.579 0.801 0.110% 0.279 0.853
36 Months 454 a 0.112% 0.438 0.803 0.095% 0.312 0.863
48 Months 466 a 0.092% 0.527 0.802 0.058% 0.636 0.833
Panel G. SEOs issued over 1970–2001 and 2002–2004
SEOs 2002–2004 94 a 0.097% 0.775 0.809 0.297% 0.449 0.745
SEOs 1970–2001 441 a 0.025% 0.872 0.786 0.036% 0.704 0.854
Panel H. SEO portfolios formed 3 and 6 months after the issue
3-Months 475 a 0.086% 0.550 0.787 0.115% 0.326 0.808
MKT 1.190 0.000 1.037 0.000
LIQ 0.099 0.039 0.060 0.119
6-Months 472 a 0.085% 0.562 0.779 0.118% 0.329 0.794
MKT 1.188 0.000 1.032 0.000
LIQ 0.086 0.077 0.054 0.179
The table reports coefficients (Estimate) from calendar time LCAPM regressions for subsamples of SEOs. T is the length of the portfolio time series, p denotes p-values, and Adj.
R2 the adjusted R-squared. Panel A classifies issuers according to industry group: Industry, Finance and Utility. Panel B shows the distribution of SEOs across equity issue type:
Combination and Primary. Panel C stratifies issuers across nine Fama and French portfolios formed on size (Small, S, Medium,Me, Big, B) and book-to-market (High, H, Medium,
M, Low, L). Panel D groups issues in Hot and Cold periods (Hot for months where the number of SEOs in the month before the issue exceeds the median over the previous
12 months, Cold for other months). Panel E groups issues occurring within 5 years of the IPO date (Age < 5 years) and 5 years after the IPO (AgeP 5 years). Panel F shows
results for event horizons of 12, 24, 36, and 48 months. Panel G groups equity issues over 1970–2001 and 2002–2004. Panel H shows LCAPM estimates for SEO portfolios
formed 3 and 6 months after the issue. EW denotes equal weighting and VW value weighting. Value weights standardize market capitalization by the value-weighted CRSP
stock market index to give comparability over time.
20 Previous studies show that stock flipping (selling allocated shares shortly after an
IPO) explains a substantial proportion of share trading after the issue. Using sales of
10,000 shares or more to approximate seller-initiated block trades, Krigman et al.
(1999) find that flipping explains 45% of trading volume on the first post-IPO trading
day for cold issues and 22% for hot issues. Using detailed data on stock flipping around
IPOs, Aggarwal (2003) reports that 19% of trading volume within two days of the IPO
is due to stock flipping, with institutional investors flipping more than retail
customers. However, Chemmanur et al. (2009) find that institutional investors sell
only 3.2% of the SEO stock allocated to them in the first two days after the issue and
conclude that stock flipping is rare after SEOs.
21 Gao and Liu (2008) use this technique to examine long-term post-acquisition
performance.
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equity in the previous 6 months and calculate BHRs for this
portfolio over the 5-year event window as the weighted sum of
individual BHRs. We obtain decomposed buy-and-hold monthly
portfolio returns using Eq. (3) of Liu and Strong (2008)
Rpt ¼
Xn
i¼1
xi
Qt1
s¼1ð1þ RisÞPn
j¼1xj
Qt1
s¼1ð1þ RjsÞ
Rit for t ¼ 2; . . . ;m ð8Þ
whereRpt is themonth t returnonaportfolio ofn stockswithmonthly
returns on individual stocks of Ris,m is the number of holding period
months, and xi is stock i’s portfolio weight. For t = 1, Rp1 ¼
Pn
i¼1xiRi1.
This approach imposes no portfolio rebalancing over the 5-year hold-
ing period. Given a time series of decomposed BHRs, the grand calen-
dar time portfolio return is Rkt ¼ wt
Pkt
p¼1Rpt , wherewt denotes either
EW or VW (see Fig. 3). EW uses the inverse of the number of decom-
posed BHR portfolios. VW uses portfolio market values at the start of
the holding period.With a 5-year holding period there is aminimum
of one and maximum of ten overlapping portfolios.
Liu and Strong (2008) show that negative serial correlation in
individual stock returns leads to higher returns, while positive
autocovariances in portfolio returns lead to lower returns on rebal-
anced portfolios compared with the decomposed portfolio. They
report a positive bias for small, low-price and loser stocks and a
negative bias for large and high-price stocks. Our SEO portfolios
comprise a mix of both stock types and there is no statistical differ-
ence between average monthly returns of both series.
Table 12 reports results using decomposed portfolio BHRs in
LCAPM calendar time regressions. For comparison, we report re-
sults from a standard calendar time approach. None of the alphas
indicate SEO underperformance. The decomposed buy-and-hold
approach does not produce materially different conclusions from
the standard calendar time approach. This is not surprising as SEOs
include liquid stocks from all size-based portfolios and are less
likely to suffer from the microstructure biases that the decom-
posed method adjusts for.
6.3. Alternative specifications of the liquidity factor
Finally, we test the robustness of our results on the lower post-
issue SEO liquidity risk exposure to alternative specifications of the
liquidity factor. We use the FF3FM augmented by Eckbo and Norli’s
(2005) LMH factor, and by the residuals (LIQ_res) from regressing
LIQ on SMB and HML (without a constant) to test if LIQ captures a
liquidity effect controlling for size and book-to-market effects.
Table 13 shows that LMH and LIQ_res are significant, controlling
for the Fama–French factors. The significant loading on LIQ_res
indicates the incremental power of liquidity risk over the Fama–
French size and B/M factors to explain the cross-section of
returns.22,23
7. Conclusions
Using four measures that each emphasize a different dimension
of liquidity, we find that SEO firms are significantly more liquid
post-issue and relative to size–B/M matched stocks. Examining
the potential causes of post-issue liquidity changes, SEO firms
experience an increase in analyst following and in institutional
holdings of their stock over the 5 years after the issue compared
with the 5 years pre-issue. Higher analyst following improves the
amount and quality of information about the firm, which lowers
adverse selection costs of trading and improves stock liquidity. In-
creased trading by institutional investors reduces the adverse
selection costs of trading with a better informed party, further
explaining SEO liquidity gains after the issue.
Fig. 3. Schematic for constructing decomposed BHR portfolio returns in calendar time. Every 6 months we form a portfolio of all stocks issuing equity in the previous
6 months, calculate buy-and-hold returns, Rpt, for this portfolio over the 5-year event window as the weighted sum of individual BHRs, and decompose portfolio BHRs into
monthly portfolio returns (Liu and Strong 2008). The grand calendar time portfolio return is Rkt ¼ wt
Pkt
p¼1Rpt where wt denotes equal weighting (EW) or value weighting
(VW). EW uses the inverse of the number of decomposed BHR portfolios in month t. VW uses market capitalization at portfolio formation as weights.
22 We also regress SEO EW and VW pooled portfolio returns on the FF3FM
augmented by Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) traded liquidity factor (PS_VW).
Untabulated results show significant PS_VW loadings for the VW portfolio only.
23 As LIQ_res is a non-traded factor, the intercepts from LIQ_res augmented FF3FM
regressions do not have the standard interpretation as tests of abnormal stock
performance.
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Estimates from pricing models show that SEOs bear less liquid-
ity risk after the offering and that size–B/M benchmarks are unable
to capture the dynamics of SEO firms’ liquidity risk. In contrast, the
liquidity augmented CAPM captures the performance of SEOs. Our
study supports a liquidity-based, low discount rate explanation for
SEO returns.
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